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It is well known that humans are the weakest link in computer security, and that developing and maintaining a culture of 
computer security is essential for managing the human aspect of computer security.  It is less well known how a 
comprehensive computer security policy incorporating both information technology computer security, and operational 
technology computer security, impacts a culture of computer security.  While a literature review of this domain includes 
research on the impact of various aspects of a computer security policy on computer security culture, no peer reviewed 
research was found that explained the impact of a comprehensive computer security policy on computer security culture 
through an understanding of its direct or indirect effects.  Thus, it is the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer 








That humans are the weakest link in computer security is well known (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; D'Arcy & 
Hovav, 2007; Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001).  A recent report by IBM (2014) contends that more than 95% of computer 
security incidents include some aspect of human error, while a recent report by PwC (2015) states that human error 
contributed to 50% of the single worst data breaches in 2015, an increase of 31% over the previous year.  As a counter 
measure to the vulnerability of human error in computer security, it has been posited that developing and maintaining a 
culture of computer security is essential for managing the human aspect of computer security (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; 
Dhillon, Syed, & Pedron, 2016; Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010).   
 
It is less well known how a comprehensive computer security policy impacts a culture of computer security, 
comprehensive being defined as incorporating both information technology computer security (IT computer security) and 
operational technology computer security (OT computer security).  While the extant literature for this peer reviewed 
research domain includes mention of the impact of various aspects of a computer security policy on computer security 
culture (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012; Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016; Vance, Lowry, & Eggett, 2013), no peer 
reviewed research was found that explained the impact of a comprehensive computer security policy on computer security 
culture through an understanding of its direct or indirect effects.   
 
Thus, it is the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on computer security 
culture, which can be further explained through indirect effects.  To support this statement, this study explores the direct 
effect that a comprehensive computer security policy has on computer security culture and on a computer security 
program, as well as the indirect effects derived therefrom.   Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following 
questions: 
 
1. Is there a direct relationship between a comprehensive computer security policy and computer security culture? 
2. Are there indirect relationships between a comprehensive computer security policy and computer security culture? 
a. Is governance a mediating factor between a comprehensive computer security policy and computer 
security culture?  
b. Is training & awareness a mediating factor between a comprehensive computer security policy and 
computer security culture?  
c. Are sanctions a mediating factor between a comprehensive computer security policy and computer 
security culture?  
3. Are there other variables that impact the relationship between a comprehensive computer security policy and computer 
security culture? 
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MOTIVATION 
 
Key to the premise of this study is the scope and ownership of the computer security policy.  This study contends that a 
computer security policy must be comprehensive in scope in order to have a meaningful impact on enterprise computer 
security culture, as a comprehensive computer security policy represents a policy that spans all aspects of enterprise 
computer security (von Solms, 2001).  This study defines a comprehensive computer security policy as a top-level policy 
incorporating enterprise ownership of both IT computer security and OT computer security.  A practical reference to this 
viewpoint is that described by the Reference Model for Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), wherein the separation 
between the IT domain and the OT domain can be paraphrased as the point of demarcation between computer decision 
support systems leveraged by humans (IT), and computer industrial control systems that make control decisions 
autonomously (OT) (CIM Reference Model Committee International Purdue Workshop on Industrial Computer Systems, 
1989).   
 
The premise of this study holds that a comprehensive scope is necessary for a computer security policy to have a 
meaningful impact on computer security culture, and that it is the comprehensive nature of the computer security policy 
that separates this study from other studies in this domain.  A comprehensive computer security policy sets the tone for 
clear ownership of enterprise computer security by recognizing the difference between IT and OT, which in turn sets the 
tone for developing and maintaining a culture of computer security across an enterprise.   Every human in the enterprise is 
responsible for computer security regardless of whether their assigned role aligns more closely with IT computer security 
than OT computer security, and vice versa, and this distinction must be recognized by a top-level policy for persistence of 
a meaningful computer security culture.       
 
The premise of this study is both novel and timely in its intent to better understand the factors that influence a culture of 
computer security, given that computer security culture is posited as an effective control for managing the human aspect of 
computer security.  The premise is novel in that no peer reviewed research was found that explained the direct effect of a 
comprehensive computer security policy on computer security culture through an understanding of its indirect effects. The 
premise is timely in that computer threats and computer vulnerabilities, sometimes referred to as cybersecurity, are 
evolving rapidly and are capable of introducing significant computer risk to an organization (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; 
National Intelligence Council, 2008).  Therefore, research that contributes to a better understanding of the factors that 





Extant research incorporating Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT), deterrence theory, and the constructs of 
perceived effectiveness, perceived avoidability, and self-efficacy were referenced to help develop the conceptual research 
model shown in Figure 1 (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2015; Compeau & Higgins, 1995; Herath & Rao, 2009; Hu, Xu, 
Dinev, & Ling, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2009).   
 
Liang & Xue (2009) contend that perceived effectiveness results from human outcome judgement regarding behavior that 
will lead to a specific outcome when performed (Bandura, 1982).  Liang & Xue also contend that perceived effectiveness 
within TTAT  measures the usefulness of the safeguard in terms of its ability to avoid a malicious threat.  Liang & Xue  
further contend that perceived avoidability results from the human perception of the effectiveness of the safeguarding 
action that is performed, and that a coping mechanism attends to the evaluation and assessment of each available 
safeguarding measure.  The self-efficacy component of TTAT suggests that the safeguarding measure with the highest 
perceived avoidability, as perceived by the user, is then selected and performed to avoid the perceived threat.  The authors 




Figure 1.  Conceptual Research Model 
 
Self-efficacy is a central theme of TTAT, in the belief that human behavior is influenced by the perceived efficacy of the 
available safeguarding actions.  TTAT theory contends that humans will adopt a safeguarding action if they perceive the 
threat will be mitigated by the safeguarding measure.  If the safeguarding measure is perceived to be ineffective, humans 
will avoid the safeguarding action and instead resort to an emotion based coping behavior in the belief that the threat is 
unavoidable (Bandura, 1982; Compeau & Higgins, 1995; Maddux & Rogers, 1983).   
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D’Arcy & Devaraj (2012) contend that the threat of sanctions, or punishment, has a direct and indirect effect on 
influencing human behavior toward information technology threats.  The threat of sanctions is drawn from deterrence 
theory, based on the belief that humans are deterred from certain behaviors given the perceived certainty and perceived 
severity of a resulting sanction (Gibbs, 1975).  As with TTAT, self-efficacy plays a role in deterrence theory given a user’s 
perception that the threat of sanctions are able to deter unwanted behavior.    
 
Following development of the conceptual research model, each of the constructs shown in Figure 1 was operationalized 
into latent variables and observable variables as shown in Figure 2.  Each of the variables shown in Figure 2 is measurable 








Data collection for this study will be performed using a survey instrument and a Likert scale for measurement.  Where 
possible, questions for the survey instrument will be drawn from similar studies conducted in this research domain.  A 
commercial Internet service will be used for survey instrument distribution and data collection. A pilot survey will be 
conducted prior to the primary data survey to ensure robustness.  Target respondents are information technology 
practitioners located within the United States, randomly selected from the information technology workforce. 
 
Multivariate data analysis techniques performed on the collected data will include confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to 
test how well the measured variables represent model constructs.  Structural equation modeling (SEM) will be used to 
estimate the overall fit of the model.  Particular attention will be given to the indirect effect of factors, both mediating and 
moderating, impacting computer security culture. 
 
DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLICATION 
 
There are no findings to report at this time as this paper represents research-in-progress.  Completion of this study is 
scheduled for 1Q2017.  Next steps include acceptance and approval of the research proposal, initiation of the data 
collection process, statistical data analysis, and writing the final report.  Findings resulting from this study will be 




It is the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on computer security culture, 
which can be further explained through indirect effects.  It is anticipated that the statistical findings of this study will 
support the conceptual research model. It is further anticipated that the findings of this study will benefit scholars and 
practitioners alike. 
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